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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 694



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

APTIDON PROPOSAL MAY BE BASIS FOR SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA SOLUTION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 8 Oct 80 pp 26-27

[Article by Angelo Perlazzo: "War or Negotiations"]

[Excerpts] Hassan Gouled Aptidon, president of the Republic of Djibouti, had made an appeal on 29 August 1980 for a negotiated solution to the Somalia-Ethiopia problem. Situated between two bellicose neighbors resolved not to give up, Djibouti is seriously affected by both the pressure applied by each of them and the burden of the war: the influx of refugees fleeing the war in the Ogaden.

It is a fact that beginning on 27 May, the situation in the Ogaden has increasingly deteriorated.

Somalia never accepted the cession of the Ogaden to Haile Selassie by the British in 1955. In the view of succeeding governments in Mogadishu, and often in that of the inhabitants of the Ogaden, this western province is an integral part of "greater Somalia." Witness the assistance granted by the Somali government to the liberation movements. As for Ethiopia, it has always treated this province--as indeed it has also done in Eritrea--as conquered territory.

Very shortly, this Horn of Africa region may well witness a Blitzkrieg comparable to the one in 1977. However, Somalia is in no condition to take on the Ethiopian army. Since their break with the Soviets, the Somalians' armaments--and especially their tanks and planes--have greatly deteriorated and are paralyzed by a lack of spare parts.

Unequal Battle

Somalians are now requesting assistance from the Western countries, arguing that Soviet expansionism can be stemmed in Mogadishu.

In the face of such a poorly equipped army, the Ethiopians are already lining up on the Somali front six divisions--two of which have recently arrived from Eritrea--reinforced by the troops that the USSR and its

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satellites maintain locally. There are reports of a Cuban 8,000-man brigade. Five-hundred thousand Ethiopian soldiers have reportedly gone through the training center located near Addis Ababa in anticipation of increased warfare in the Ogaden and Eritrea.

To these must be added the sophisticated material that the Soviets have consistently been shipping to Ethiopia by large transport aircraft: Migs, heavy tanks, and more recently anti-guerilla helicopters similar to those used in Afghanistan.

In an effort to check these developments, three diplomatic initiatives have been advanced to-date to bring the two countries to a negotiated solution. At the beginning of August, France proposed holding a conference between the countries of the Horn of Africa, an initiative which was apparently shelved because of Ethiopian skepticism despite the enthusiastic agreement of those other countries invited to participate.

The second initiative resulted in the meeting of a mediating committee of the OAU in Lagos from 18 to 21 August. There was no communique, but this committee reportedly sided with Ethiopia in the name of the intangibility of borders resulting from the decolonization, as well as the policy of condemning any subversive movement aimed against a member-state.

Hopes for Peace

Somalia now demands a referendum for self-determination in the Ogaden.

The third initiative came from Hassan Gouled Aptidon. It is interesting because it breaks through the problem of awarding the Ogaden to either country by inviting both to study together concrete solutions for the region's economic problems, granting men and goods complete freedom of circulation.

Considering the acceleration of military preparations, this proposal appears well nigh impossible; moreover, Ethiopia could launch a show of force ahead of the arrival of U.S. arms, an initiative which would actually solve nothing, and surely not the future of the Ogaden. But President Gouled's appeal goes beyond the regional context and urges both international organizations and the great powers to intervene so that the conflict will not degenerate further. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union are interested in somehow facing each other once one of the two fronts is run through. It is consequently up to them to contain the bellicose ardor of their respective partners. President Gouled's initiative could then serve as a basis for negotiations.

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CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

JAPANESE FISHING EQUIPMENT--A contract for fishing equipment was signed between Cape Verde and two Japanese firms, Yamaha Motors Limited and Hakodate Seimo Company Limited. The announcement was made in Praia on 24 September. The contract includes two fiberglass boats, each with 120-hp motor and completely equipped with fishing gear, two groups of machines and tools to equip two motor assembly plants and 630 outboard motors of 5 to 8-hp each. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Oct 80 p 2414]

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

POPULATION REMAINS DEEPLY DISSATISFIED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 15-22 Sep 80 pp 40-42

[Article by Ginette Cot--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] The job of puppet is definitely becoming more and more difficult...Dacko is finding this out day by day.

It's not easy, today when the peoples of the Third World are struggling to make their independence a reality, to try to rule and regiment a country like in the good old days of colonialism at the beginning of the century. France, at this point, is tasting the bitter fruit in Central Africa. For the most recent vicissitudes in Bangui, where, after nearly 6 months of suspense, Henri Maidou, the vice president, and Bernard-Christian Ayandho, the prime minister of the "government of public welfare" established by French Transalls on 21 September 1979, were dismissed, show the difficulties--if not defeat--encountered by Paris in completing "Operation Barracuda;" that is in fashioning a credible government that would put an end to the Central African crisis, while safeguarding the strategic, economic, and political objectives of French imperialism.

It is not, however, for lack of means. With the reactivation of the base at Bouar (in connection with which Galley, the French minister for cooperation, and then General Bigeard, came to Bangui respectively in May and July, to examine the project); with the presence of some 12,000 French soldiers (including some repatriated from Chad), Central Africa is today a militarily occupied country. And the influx of hundreds of "assistants," "technicians," and "advisers" from France restricts the freedom to maneuver of the Central African cadres, magistrates, and ministers more than tightly. As to "President" Dacko, it is known how he is surrounded and "protected," and how today a French "colonel" watches over him continually and whispers to him what to do in the least details.

However, and this is the decisive factor, behind this stagecraft and this vast force of foreign forces of every kind, there is the Central African populace which, profoundly frustrated in its struggle and in its expectation,

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does not want a new subjection. And it is a factor which cannot be ignored. Once over the initial shock, high-school and college students, teachers and labor unionists, as well as, in ever increasing numbers, the cadres, have unceasingly resisted, opposed, each in his own sphere, with the means at hand, pressing with specific demands, sometimes apparently innocuous ones, but always in the subjacent prospect of winning back their dignity, putting an end to the foreign occupation and the policy of complicity with the former collaborators of Bokassa.

Since the establishment of Dacko's government of "public welfare," a year ago, not a week has gone by without a strike or a work stoppage being unleashed in one or another economic sector of the country. Similarly, the functionaries have tried to organize themselves to protect their interests, making use as needed of the structures the government has put in place. Thus, a steady stream of complaints has flowed to the Superior Council of the Civil Service, established by the government to "examine living and working conditions of agents of the state."/

As the months have gone by, tension has been building up, and the vigilance of the unions was further reinforced by the announcement of the recovery plan elaborated by French "advisers," and which should result, with the austerity measures anticipated (reduction in the number of functionaries and students) and the privatization of part of the public sector, in the elimination of hundreds, even thousands of job positions. Already, on 5 April, the UGTC [General Union of Central African Workers] protested against the elimination, since 21 September 1979, of 2,000 jobs in the private sector, 10 enterprises having closed their doors and others reduced their activity.

On 6 May, in order to attempt to contain the discontent, the government raised the guaranteed interoccupational minimum wage and the guaranteed minimum agricultural wage to 13,000 Central African Francs, a sum which nevertheless remains contemptible in the face of the constant deterioration in living conditions of the people; according to a recent study, a family living in Bangui would need an income of 60,000 CAR Francs to make ends meet.

On 24 May, the executive bureau of UGTC forced government to make another retreat. It obtained, after having threatened to unleash a general strike, the dismissal from his functions of Mr Galin-Douathe (third minister of labor and of justice in the government of "public welfare"). The latter had been taken to task by UGTC for having ordered the arrest of about 10 strikers from the Central African Office of Social Security (OCSS) several days before the opening of the congress of the trade unions confederation.

That is to say that the workers and the Central African unionists have unceasingly struggled hand to hand against a leadership team whose incompetence was notorious and who scarcely set the example of austerity which they themselves preached (in particular the high salaries that the "powerful" men in the regime allocated to themselves, also wealthy owners of buildings

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and businesses, as well as their ministers were a subject of scandal in the populous quarters of Bangui; as proof of which, one of the decisions announced after the establishment of the new ministerial cabinet on 17 July was the reduction in salaries of members of the council).

In student circles, too, commitment is as strong as ever. And Dacko's exhortations, urging the students not to concern themselves with affairs of state, have been in vain. On 9 and 10 April, after their return from Easter vacations, the students unleashed a strike to protest against the tighter [student] selection measures. At the same time, they held a demonstration of support for Malian students in the course of which slogans hostile to vice president Maidou (nicknamed "minister of denials" during the bloody repression of student demonstrations in 1979) were paraded.

In May, it was rumored that the teachers were planning to [hold a] strike [during] final examinations that alerted the Dacko government. In June, the crisis took a more bitter turn. Confrontations pitting peasants against the police, especially in the regions of Ouham and Ouham Pende, were reported. Finally, on the day of the written test for the baccalaureate, on 25 [June], the college and secondary students of Bangui began to demonstrate their disapproval. They protested against several "anomalies:" the fact that subjects for the examination had not been presented during the year; the exclusion of several students for "cheating," and finally the predominant role of French teachers.

On 27 [June], the students penetrated to the secretariat of the baccalaureate, where they took several professors hostage, including 7 Frenchmen. With the arrival of the police, it was over in short order. But the following day a major demonstration took place before the statue of Boganda (the founder of the Central African Republic) to cries of /"We want a national baccalaureate."/ For, at the heart of all the skirmishing the street inflicts on the puppet government, are nationalist demands and rejection of the French effort to keep the country under the current colonial guardianship. Transient observers in Bangui are also unanimous in discerning the growing and almost universal hostility of the Central Africans toward "para-troopers," "technicians," "advisers," or "assistants" from France, that is toward everything at which this operation of reconquest is aimed.

It was also the pressure of Central African public opinion which necessitated the holding last February of a series of trials of several of Bokassa's accomplices. Despite the limits put on the commission on inquest set up to this end, there was a risk of things going too far. One recalls, in fact, that Henri Maidou, then vice president of the republic, and Alphonse Koyamba, himself vice-prime minister at the time, had been implicated by some of the accused, and that initiatives were taken to get them to appear before the high court in Bangui.

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It is also known that, following this affair, Gueret, then minister of justice, had been removed from his duties in March, despite the protests of the magistrates. Enormous pressures were exerted to stop the course of the investigations, and, finally, on 11 August, the Supreme Court of Central Africa, in its first public audience, rescinded and annulled the judgment handed down last February by the criminal court that had condemned Mayomokola Josephat (former chief of staff of the imperial army) to death for murder and complicity in the murder of children in January 1979.

The Supreme Court, which justified its decision on the pretext that "/ certain provisions of the law were not properly applied by the first judges,"/ must review three other cases carrying the death penalty for 5 other torturers who, for 14 years, executed detainees at the Ngaragba prison, on orders of Bokassa. But the issue seems hardly in doubt. For, as Gueret, the former minister of justice, recently said, "/Dacko is shifty,"/ some of those sentenced to death (Mokoa, Bassia, Sabaka, Dedeavode) being "his direct relatives."/...

Nevertheless, the organizers of "Operation Barracuda" have, from all the evidence, minimized the combattiveness of the Central African people, and France seems firmly caught in a trap that it is difficult to see how it can extricate itself from without taking into account the real facts of the situation. It is true that the plan put into effect by Paris was fundamentally tainted. It could only have taken a few hours to realize that David Dacko, the perpetual bungler, was hardly adequate to his mission. And a few months would have been enough to conclude that the team put together after 21 September 1979 was rent by insurmountable contradictions and rivalries, which were leading the government of "public welfare" to paralysis.

Once the crucial dates were specified (elaboration of the constitution which must precede the presidential elections anticipated in early 1981), misunderstandings grew more serious among the four "powerful" men of the regime (Dacko, Maidou, Ayandho, and Koyamba), and the crisis, from June on, broke into public view. The lack of enthusiasm shown by the money-lenders meeting at this time in Bangui--despite the promises made--demonstrated clearly that their intention was to see that the situation within the puppet government was cleaned up before getting down to any serious business. But how?

Just at the last minute--many signs pointed to this--Henri Maidou, ex-prime minister of Bokassa and vice president of the government of "public welfare" of Dacko, appeared to be the favorite of Paris, or at the very least among certain circles. But doubtless one should have also counted on Dacko's "tenacity." However that may be, the dissolution of the government of "public welfare" on 9 July was welcomed enthusiastically by the people, who rightly interpreted this decision as an admission of failure. But this was only the beginning of a long period of waiting which was going to be rich in twists and turns. On 17 July a new government with 21 members (compared to 14 in the previous) was constituted. Prominently noted were the eviction of Koyamba and the nomination to the post of vice-prime minister of the

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former ambassador to France, Sylvestre Bangui, still responsible for foreign affairs. But of the prime minister, up to then Bernard-Christian Ayandho, no mention was made. Similarly, no mention was made of the fate of vice-president Maidou.

Were they or were they not dismissed? This is what the "street" was waiting for: this is also what the new ministers were asking. But the following day, Henry Maidou let it be known through a statement to Agence France Presse [AFP] that he was in no way involved in the dissolution of the government of "public welfare," as he was named vice president of the republic on 21 September 1979 by a special decree. Several days later, in an interview on Radio Bangui, he declared himself a supporter of a limited multi-party system, and posted his candidacy to the presidency, while maintaining that it was he who had asked French intervention to overthrow Bokassa.

Struggle For Power

For his part, on 10 August Bernard-Christian Ayandho as prime minister explained the objectives of the new government and placed himself also in the ranks of the succession, by affirming that he, along with two other Dacko partisans (Galin-Douathe and Koyamba) had /"worked clandestinely"/ for Bokassa's fall.

All this testified to an intense struggle for power, as was illustrated by the sudden visits of Martin Kirsch, adviser to the French president on African affairs, on 1 August in Bangui, then, later, on 23 [August], the visit of Fabien Oumbouma, personal adviser to the chief of state of Gabon, from where Robert, the French ambassador and former member of the French secret service (SDECE) [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service], watches over the region.

It was under these circumstances that on 23 August Radio Bangui announced the startling news: the ousting of Maidou and Ayandho from office, and their placement /"under the protection of the police and the Central African army"/...

An initial round was just finished, and Dacko found himself alone at the helm, muzzled more than ever. His "advisers" indicated on his behalf that he would soon explain, but that one could already say with certainty that the ousting of Maidou and Ayandho was the result of /"a long-ripening decision"/ of the chief of state. The unpopularity of the two men, /"due to the climate of discord and of rivalry reigning in Bangui, aroused concern for their safety if there were demonstrations against them,"/ added these authorized sources....

It goes without saying that the problem is far from being resolved and that one can expect further twists and turns. For only a round table freely organized of the political and social components of the Central African people would be able to resolve the crisis. But can French imperialism steel itself to this solution?

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CHAD

PARIS WEEKLY AIRS LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTRY'S CONFLICT

LD171415 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 15 Oct 80 p 43

["Exclusive" report by Christian Grain: "Al-Qadhdhafi Wants an End to the Situation"]

[Text] Libya is now going "all out" in Chad in an attempt to destroy Hissein Habre, leader of the FAN which have been fighting for 7 months against all the other armed factions grouped round Goukouni Oueddei.

The contingents of Al-Qadhdhafi's famous "Islamic legion," and arrivals of arms and munitions have increased at least tenfold since mid-August. Since the motorized columns coming from Sebha and the Oufra oasis can no longer cross most of the Bourkou, Innedi and Tibesti region--which has rallied to Hissein Habre, aside from Fada in the northeast and Tibesti in the northwest--due to the strong presence of the FAN, Tripoli is now using air routes.

Underground Fighter

At the end of June large transport aircraft landed at Massakorry (150 km north of N'Djamena) where munitions were also dropped by parachute. Now an endless stream of Libyan Hercules C-130s are landing men, arms and munitions at Douguia, 60 km north of N'Djamena.

The offensives and intensive fire to which the districts of N'Djamena controlled by Hissein Habre have been subjected since mid-September bear witness to Libya's increased effort. Witnesses have been able to detect the presence of large numbers of Libyan advisers and have noted that this presence corresponded to greater accuracy of fire by DM3 and BM19 mortars and even, it is stated, by GRAD (surface-to-surface missiles). It remains to be seen whether this massive aid from Tripoli will enable the forces supporting Goukouni to defeat Hissein Habre's FAN. Hitherto the FAN have always resisted in a way which has not only surprised many observers but which in addition has been regarded as a victory in itself by those who gave them scarcely any chance when the conflict broke out 21 March 1980.

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In addition, persistent rumors indicate that Egypt has decided to supply arms to the FAN in order to counter Libya. Since the beginning of September, Hercules C-130 aircraft have apparently been landing at El-Geneina, in Sudan, around 30 km from Abeche, or even in Abeche itself-- the city which Hissein Habre has turned into his province in eastern Chad.

Goukouni seems confident: "I fought underground for 14 years," he said, "I have enough experience of prolonged wars." However, he too could well pay the price for the Libyan determination to install in N'Djamena a regime entirely loyal to Libya. Goukouni was appointed president of FROLINAT's revolution council at the "reunification" conference held in Faya in May 1978, but he is being increasingly opposed by pro-Libyan factions in the movement who have already tried to eliminate him with the aid of Libyan soldiers.

According to several FROLINAT sources, pro-Libyans such as Acyl Ahamet, (Rakhis Manani), (Ascheikh Ibn Omar) and (Asseid Gamar Sileck) are demanding the rapid convening of another revolution council for Goukouni and his supporters to explain their successive alliances with Libya, France and again Libya. They are asking them notably to say why and how they decided to "descend" on N'Djamena in February 1979 when Hissein Habre had just defeated President Felix Mallium's troops in the capital. They criticize Goukouni for having reached on that occasion "reciprocal non-aggression agreements" with Louis Dallier who was French ambassador at the time, and hence with the French soldiers.

Finally, they think that Goukouni cannot remain both president of the national unity transition government and president of the revolution council, and hence faction chief, and they want him to resign from the latter post rather than the former. Indeed that would enable them to continue to put forward a president regarded as "legal" under the terms of the Lagos agreements (August 1979), with the revolution council continuing to take the important decisions.

'Hands Tied'

Hissein Habre's supporters think that these superficial changes would merely be one more step toward Goukouni Oueddei's ultimate elimination, planned for a long time by Tripoli, while according to them "his hands are already tied and he is no longer master of what he says and does."

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ETHIOPIA

BRIEFS

TOXIC GAS--Ethiopian troops in Eritrea are probably using gas supplied by East Germany which paralyzes and is lethal. At least, that is what the ELF says. It specifies that gas masks have been distributed to Addis Ababa units fighting at the front. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 8 Oct 80 p 31]

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

ISLAMIC BANK LOAN--The Saudi Information Agency has announced that the Islamic Bank will grant Guinea a 10 million dollar loan aimed at the importation of refined oil from Libya. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Oct 80 p 2415]

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IVORY COAST

PRESIDENT EXPRESSES FEAR WEST IS LOSING AFRICA

Paris PARIS MATCH 15 Aug 80 pp 3-7, 9

[Interview with Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Ivory Coast President, by Philippe de Baleine--date and place not given]

[Text] They call him the Wise Man of Africa, because the country over whose destiny Felix Houphouet-Boigny has presided for 25 years, the Ivory Coast, has had remarkable stability, holds no political prisoner, has never seen an execution, despite several plots and, especially, has enjoyed an increasing prosperity compared with the stagnation that the rest of Africa is experiencing. President Houphouet-Boigny has chosen cooperation with France and the West. He believed, and still does, that he made a good choice. But he is wondering: The West is abandoning and not fulfilling its obligation to Africa. It is running the risk of losing Africa, and thereby losing itself. That is what he says in his interview by our editor-in-chief, Philippe de Baleine.

[Question] The eyes of the world are on Africa. It is there that the great conflicts of tomorrow are brewing. Lately you have indicated your pessimism. Why is that?

[Answer] Our fears are extremely great regarding the gradual destabilizing of the African states, which we are watching very anxiously. I have always said that the one who controls Africa will control the world. It is the most important thing at stake in the struggle for world hegemony. I do not believe in an armed confrontation between Russia and the West--I do not include China. The balance of terror explains my optimism. But we still have the problem of detente, in the shelter of which the Russians are gradually taking over Africa. Of course, we all want detente, but how is detente seen in the West? They consider it an end in itself, a kind of assuagement. In the East, however, it is different. Detente is considered a means and not an end, a means by which to take the West's vigilance by surprise. The Russians are pursuing a specific objective: the victory

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of communism in the world. They may pause for a while, or even step back, but their objective is never lost from view. In the Ivory Coast, we have a Baoule proverb: "The winding road does not make the basin distorted." The Russians may follow winding roads, but that will not change a thing about their ideology of conquest. I am therefore afraid of the different ways in which the West and the East regard detente.

[Question] But why are you so worried about one area of East-West conflict, Africa?

[Answer] The struggle between the West and Russia will take place at the economic level, i.e., the real battlefield will be the supply of raw materials. Europe is deficient in them. In France, your iron and coal mines are being exhausted. The United States does not have enough raw materials to support Europe's industry. Asia of course has raw materials, but in the future it will barely have enough to take care of its own needs. That leaves Africa, by far the richest in raw materials. Africa is number one in iron, copper, manganese, uranium, bauxite (Guinea has reserves for several centuries), and gold, and tomorrow it will very likely be extremely rich in oil. Do not forget that at the time of the Italian colonization, Libya was thought to be the poorest country in Africa. Who would have thought that beneath its sand lay a vast fortune? Let me add that oil drilling has just begun in Africa. It is with regard to supplying Europe with Africa's raw materials that the Russians are waiting for you. Their goal is to prevent these deliveries from getting to Europe.

[Question] Do you mean that they want to take the materials for themselves?

[Answer] The Russians are not going to Africa to use its raw materials. That is the least of their worries. Whatever they need, they have in Siberia. The Russians' goal is to prevent the African countries where they have gained a foothold, using Cuba as intermediary, from delivering those raw materials to Europe. How are they doing this? The Russians know that the enemy of any communist government is the happiness of the people. The ally of communism is generalized poverty. In all socialized governments--Angola, Brazzaville, Ethiopia, to mention a few states--they are not using the raw materials, but they have destroyed stability. Prior to any development there must be stability, peace through justice. Wherever this peace is disturbed, stability is destroyed. All the African countries where communist influence reigns have been made unstable from organized poverty. If communist influence is expanded, and if Africa is incapable of delivering raw materials to the West, the productivity of your industry will be compromised. In such a way, Russia will paralyze Europe without firing a single shot.

[Question] What can the West do to avert this danger?

[Answer] The West is committing serious blunders with regard to Africa, and especially friendly and prosperous countries like the Ivory Coast which

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exports a great deal to the West. The most serious blunder is not paying what they should for the raw materials of friendly countries which are joined to the West by culture, language and liberal economy.

[Question] Can you give a specific example of those Western blunders?

[Answer] With respect to the Ivory Coast, the West's greatest blunder is its refusal to pay a suitable price for our cacao and coffee. In 3 years, prices for coffee have been reduced by one-half, and for cacao, by two-thirds (!). The Ivory Coast has no other resources but its agriculture, on which, in contrast to most African states, it has staked everything. At present, the prices proposed by the West for our farm products not only do not keep up with world inflation, but they are lower. The prices for the present campaign are not even guaranteed. The prices for our vital exports are at the disposal of the stock marketeers' whims. Europe is playing with the lives of our peasants, not realizing that it is playing with its own destiny at the same time.

[Question] Who benefits from this crime?

[Answer] The pledges of price stability which the Westerners signed at Yaounde and Lome were accepted by the Nine. But we also sell to others, including the United States and Russia. In fact, the New York Stock Exchange, which fixes the prices, or the London Stock Exchange, are completely speculative markets. In the end, despite their promises, the Nine were obliged to conform and to go along with these speculative routes. There has been a drop in price not only for cacao and coffee, but also for uranium, iron ore, and copper. What are we to do about all this? The price for ore is lowered, but not for steel!

[Question] Is it enough to say, as you do, "The West is going to lose Africa?"

[Answer] What might happen as a result of Europe's selfish policy is the impoverishment and instability of its best friend, the Ivory Coast. Let me give you an example of what happened in Ghana, a country made completely unstable. It was by far the most highly developed territory in Western Africa. It had many strong cadres. It was the greatest producer of cacao, with 550,000 tons per year. Then came the fall of N'Khruma and with it the fall of cacao. The output of the Ghanaian peasants suffered immediately. There was series of coups. When the leaders think only of power, they are no longer concerned with development. Every 2 years there were coups. Today Ghana seems to be breaking Bolivia's record--189 coups in 150 years. The absence of authority has made everything disorganized. On the other hand, here in the Ivory Coast there has been political stability, social peace and, as a result, prosperity. We have become the biggest producer of cacao, and second in coffee. We have good supplies of palm oil, cotton and rubber. This is a remarkable exception for Africa, and our standard of

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living continues to rise. But all we have is the earth for our livelihood, and our admirable peasant masses. I want to keep them in the forefront. I want to offer them equal opportunity, just as I want to offer equal opportunity to our young people, with free education at every level. The West, however, is not helping us. Our extraordinary progress is not being supported. We do not even have the right to a just reward for our work.

[Question] No doubt you are right. But why is speculation more powerful than the political desires of your friends, e.g., France and, in particular, Valery Giscard d'Estaing?

[Answer] Each year the Nine lean toward the European farm market, to discuss its prices. They always agree upon a yearly increase in Europe's farm prices for wheat, milk, meat, etc. They disagree only about interest rates. But when it comes to African goods, there is neither agreement, increase, nor even stability. President Valery Giscard d'Estaing is doing everything to help us. It must be said that there are three stages of discussion with the Common Market.

First of all, there are the officials, then the ministers, and those at the top. Until now, however, we have only had discussions at the first level, with the officials. Our problems have never gone to the top, because those problems were the exclusive property of large capital. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, I have just learned, has managed to get the Ivorian foreign affairs minister seen by the English and German foreign affairs ministers. We are making great progress.

[Question] Can't the political leaders of Europe, which really needs Africa's stability and prosperity, do anything to stop the speculators?

[Answer] The speculators are still very powerful. In the United States, I discussed our farm prices. They sent me back to the businessmen. It would take a political willingness to check the speculation; without that, the North-South efforts at understanding have no chance to succeed. Speculating with our raw materials means making the economy unstable. More than the Russians, for you Westerners, the enemy in Africa are your own stock markets.

[Question] In the meantime, how have the speculators succeeded in imposing the prices which are ruining you?

[Answer] They have used gross lies to justify their speculation on a decline. They said, for example, that there was a surplus--which is false. They were hoping that we would give in because they thought that with our humidity we would not be able to keep our cacao. They were wrong, for we have found advanced techniques for storing cacao more than a year.

[Question] If this pricing question concerning your raw materials were resolved, which our president is working toward, would everything be all right?

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[Answer] I have another grievance against the West. They helped us to set up our industries here, but they refuse to import what we produce. They take in very little merchandise from our factories. They only want to buy our raw materials. So why have they helped us form cadres and develop? In my opinion, the West lacks imagination. The consequences will be serious for Africa. I am sounding the alarm.

[Question] In spite of your present concerns, you are still enjoying total prosperity, while the rest of Africa is plunged into stagnation.

[Answer] In the Ivory Coast, I have staked everything on agriculture, just as Mao did in China. That is our secret. I have refused the presidency of the OAU, just as I have refused the presidency of all the other African organizations. I just want to be a peasant-president. I believe in the African peasant, because he is a factor of peace and stability. When I think about the many coups which have been carried out in the world, I see two reasons for it: 1) inevitable ambition: "Make room for me," and 2) the invariable presence of peasant misery in the background. If, out of the billions spent in Iran on the army, just one-third had been set aside for the peasants, there would not have been that mysticism-tinged revolution taking over the poor.

[Question] For the moment, according to my information, the desert is tending to move into Western Africa, especially as a result of the deforestation which is particularly rampant in the Ivory Coast.

[Answer] If the promises of oil discoveries in the Ivory Coast prove true, we will stop exporting wood. Deforestation in our country is, in fact, a source of worry because of climatology. We are going to retimber and plant fast-growing trees. By the end of the century, the Ivory Coast will have restored its forests.

[Question] Are you worried about the Cubans' activity in Africa?

[Answer] I am more worried about the deterioration of the prices for our raw materials than I am about the Cubans. Besides, the Cubans are not the ones to be feared, but the Russians. Cuba has neither ships nor weapons. The Russians are using the Cubans. They are the "Swiss of the Russians." It would be better not to talk about the Cubans, but about the Russians whose purpose, I repeat, remains that of setting up unstable governments, impoverishing the people, and forbidding the "socialist" African countries to export their raw materials to the West. And if the West continues to hinder us through trade injustices, the instability will spread. There will be more misery among the masses, which will justify the coups even if nothing comes of them. The Russians will win on all counts, and the West will be the loser. The least one can do for a cow which is giving her milk is to feed her some grass. The cooperation which had, at one time, become a golden rule must be reestablished, and it must continue for our children and grandchildren, starting with the sharpened consciousness of our North-South cooperative effort.

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[Question] What kinds of relations do you have with the Russians at the present time?

[Answer] We have no diplomatic relations with the Russians, and I am hardly even concerned about it. I am really more worried about my friends than about my enemies. Those are the ones I am stuck with. I parted company with the Russian ambassador; he was using subversive propaganda in my country. He was telling the peasants: "They are buying cacao from you at a low price and selling it dirt cheap at Western rummage sales. Your president is not protecting you." I called the ambassador to my residence here at Cocody. He was sitting in the same chair you are now. I said to him, "A small country can have excuses for lying, but not a large country. You are buying 10,000 tons of cacao a year from us. What price are you paying us for it? The same as the West. So, are you stealing from us too?" I related that conversation to the peasants.

Since the ambassador continued his propaganda among the students and intellectuals, I decided to get rid of him. I'd have to say that in a year and a half of their presence, the Russians did not even give us a box of matches. Furthermore, the same thing is true in all the African countries where they have planted themselves. They do not give anything but weapons. The ambassador had forgotten that I sleep like a crocodile, with my eyes open.

[Question] Are you worried, like President Senghor of Senegal, about Kaddafi's attempts to bring instability to Africa's Sahel region?

[Answer] Kaddafi does not have the means for achieving his ambitions, but if there is poverty and disarray in Africa, he will find people to carry out his designs. And what is the West doing now? It does not look ahead, it is running behind the events. The West made the world what it is, and now it is abandoning it. Evidently, Libyan oil is curbing its activity, is it not?

[Question] Are there any other threats awaiting the African states that are still stable?

[Answer] There are some attempts to be feared. Sekou Toure, who has again turned toward the West, was the victim of a grenade attempt 2 months ago during a reception. Sekou Toure told me, "It was not the work of a Westerner." He did not specify as to where it came from, but I understood him. What I gather from this is that for all those who want to bring instability to our continent, any way is just as good; if they cannot stir up the masses, they will try to kill the leaders.

[Question] Your list of charges against the West is harsh. To listen to you, we have done nothing but the wrong thing. But we have financed your development.

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[Answer] Let us talk about that. Here is something else for which I often reproach the West: the dishonesty of certain businesses. The most recent example is the sugar complex built by Canadian or Belgian manufacturers, which, we learned from an Egyptian expert, was overextended by 34 billion francs. As a result, the manufacturing costs of the sugar that we produce is now too high. The only sugar complex which was sold at the right price was Borotou, which was built by the French.

[Question] Are you hoping that the West will treat you as it should, i.e., as one of its best--and rare--friends in Africa?

[Answer] Yes, if the West changes its economic policy toward Africa and, yes, if the West understands that the best weapon against the unexpected is not sending planes or troops to the friendly African countries but making the people's life easier. There is no other barrier to the communist wave. Everywhere that other weapons are tried, they fail, just like in Asia where they had forgotten about the existence of those large crowds of poorly nourished peasants. Besides this, the people of the West have done nothing but blunder in Asia. They are the ones who replaced Shianouk with Lon Nol. In Afghanistan, why didn't the West support the Daoud government, instead of waking up too late and crying about human rights being violated?

[Question] You speak in a language which reminds me especially of President Nixon.

[Answer] President Nixon is a personal friend. He came to see me in Abidjan. We talked at length. He has a sense of responsibility. Someday America will realize that it made a big mistake by removing that leader, under the pretext of Watergate. What country does not have secret listening devices? I share the same concerns of President Nixon.

[Question] How do you think the Chadian crisis can be resolved?

[Answer] What is happening in Chad is the anguish of a people. Nothing can be done. It just so happens that they have discovered oil there...I have to say that...I do not see a solution at the moment. I wonder what will become of N'Djamena after the war. The conflicting parties have weapons which are as sophisticated as those used in Berlin during the war.

[Question] People are talking about your successor. You are 75 years old. Some people in France are amazed that you still have not designated anyone. They say that you are holding on to the power.

[Answer] As I have said, I refused all the presidencies of the African organizations. At my age, no one has any more ambition. I told that to General Gaulle by citing this anecdote: "Before she died, my poor mother had said to me, 'Son, if you don't want to fall down, stay in bed.' 'What do you mean, Mother,' I asked her. 'Well, you have grown up with your two feet on the ground. You know that if you are always standing up you might block the view of the people in back of you. They will push you and you will fall down. But if you go to bed willingly, so that you won't spoil

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- the other people's view, there are some charitable men who will get you up.'" That is why I want to stay in my position. It is a place which will never be disputed.

[Question] You are proceeding toward a notable democratization of your government. Should we see there the disinterest in power which you spoke to us about?

[Answer] Through our reforms, we are really trying to do something which has never been tried in Africa and which I think will be a useful example to all the other countries on the continent. We are going to try to show that a single party is not incompatible with democracy. From now on, the candidates will no longer be appointed to office by the Party, but they will be chosen freely in every district and every village. Thus they will get back to good judgement. In the villages, they know how to appreciate the best dancer, the best singer or the best farmer. In the villages, they also know who is the best representative of the people. The Party is ordered no longer to become involved in the appointment of the candidates. Even I will not attend the conferences where the citizens of my village will meet. With the new election rules, young people will be more numerous among the elected representatives. I had formerly made national lists on which the names of some young people were placed. These young deputies now must be recognized at the base; they must pass the test again. And then there are some new young people. They will be able to take their own chances. For now, this unique in Africa.

[Question] But you do not have the pluralism of parties which people in the West consider the rule for true democracy.

[Answer] I do not believe in the pluralism of parties for our country, in any case not now. In the United States, I was asked, "How can a man who was in the French parliament accept the single party government in his own country?" I told them: "Shall I answer you with a question? When you gained your independence, after a memorable struggle against the English, how many parties did you have? The answer: We only had one. That's right. It was only after the victory that we had several." "We are in the same position you were at that time," I answered. "We are a young state with 60 tribes. We have to avoid the two dangers: tribal disputes and generation disputes. If we add to this political party disputes, we will never get back together again. We will have no national unity." The Americans seemed to understand. We have not inherited a nation, but an artificial state born out of colonization. It will take years for it to become a nation. The two disputes are being resolved; the tribes are getting used to living together, everywhere we have revived the cadres; three-fourths of the service branch heads and ministers are young university students. I know that we will be imitated in our election reforms by the other countries of Africa, as we have been imitated when we decided to celebrate Independence Day every year in a different city. Every time, the center chosen as capital for a day receives a definite incentive toward its development, because important things are happening there. You see, in the

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Ivory Coast, we do not want to confuse swiftness with rushing. For us, revolution is a work with one "R" too many. Besides, in the other African countries, you can see those unending coups, and those revolutionaries who are destroying each other. Look at the states of Mali, Uganda, Maruitania, the Congo which is 12 years behind. Indeed, the ones who are most afraid of revolution are the revolutionaries.

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IVORY COAST

YACE, HOUPHOUET'S SUCCESSOR, 'DEPOSED'

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Sep 80 pp 30-33

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "There Is No Longer A Dauphin"]

[Text] Philippe Yace believed that he was Houphouet's successor.

It turned out that he was only his tool.

"It appears that for so many years President Houphouet trusted the most unpopular man in the Ivory Coast!" With a burst of laughter, Philippe Yace, secretary-general of the party (PDCI-RDA [Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast--African Democratic Rally]), president of the National Assembly and because of this position Houphouet-Boigny's constitutional "dauphin," confounds those who point out to him how notoriously unpopular he is with numerous Ivorians.

Nevertheless, several days before the 7th Party Congress (29 September-1 October 1980), Philippe Gregoire Yace appears to be the first victim of the overhaul of Ivorian political leadership decided upon by "the Old Man," as President Felix Houphouet-Boigny is nicknamed (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1016). Not showing his 60 years, with a smile too precise not to look like a mechanical grin, eyes sparkling with malice behind thin-rimmed glasses, Philippe Yace has the physique of his position. His extreme thinness laced into the inevitable three-piece suit--wool or alpaca--worn by Ivorians of high society, ready drinker of a glass of champagne, he affects a cordiality which poorly hides his legendary impatience. His voice is too soft to conceal his sudden outbursts and his tone too dry when he does not appreciate a remark. His aides state that Yace is a work addict. Indeed, he is known for wanting to decide everything; when he does not make a decision, nothing happens. "I like a fiery spirit and youth," he declares, without doubt because he himself pursued his career with the ardent will to surpass all his potential competitors. He succeeded in this. Having become what the people of Abidjan call "the highest of the high of the high," the saint had no more to fear but God: Felix Houphouet-Boigny.

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He was right, because the first three days of September 1980 saw the consecration of Philippe Yace's disfavor. During four hours on Monday, 1 September, President Houphouet again explained what he understands by "democratization of the party" before 202 members of the guidance committee (70 of them from the political office) and 190 chief secretaries of subsections, gathered at a pre-congress at Yamoussoukro. As is his habit, he outlined the measures which all participants ratified unanimously: decentralization of the party management, which could be entrusted to a permanent secretariat (and no longer a general one), canceling of the single list in order to permit all Ivoirians over 23 to canvass (in disorder) for the 147 deputy seats to be filled in October.

The Old Nursery

This last decision by itself ends the all-powerfulness of Philippe Yace. Formerly master (always after God) of the political office, it was he who prepared--and thus set--the list of candidates for election to the legislature. Reconstitution of the leadership team by democratic means in effect finishes the career of a man who owed his rise to only one man, "the Old Man."

Philippe Yace is in fact Houphouet-Boigny's creation. Born 23 January 1920 in Jacquerville, he was molded in the William-Ponty school (Senegal) which was the old nursery of West African management. However, he chose a different road from that taken by his compatriots, whom he was later to work alongside or come up against. In 1940 he obtained his teaching diploma; his seniors, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Jean-Baptiste Mockey, Auguste Denise, were already physicians or pharmacists--the top drawer in colonial Africa. Worse, while the hour of Ivory Coast nationalism was sounding, Philippe Yace was drafted to save France. An ordinary corporal, enrolled in the 6th colonial infantry regiment of Dakar, he participated in the North African and French campaigns against Hitler's forces. At the end of World War II, Philippe Yace was a member of the French occupation forces in Germany and was demobilized only in February 1946.

To Catch Up With History

In the meantime, the Ivory Coast had begun to exist. A landowner, but hurt by the exorbitant advantages enjoyed by white colonists, Felix Houphouet-Boigny had taken the lead in an African "revolt" against forced labor. In 1944 he formed the African Agricultural Syndicate (SAA) which soon included 20,000 farmers. One year later, fusion of the SAA and of communist study groups in Abidjan gave birth to the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast, the PDCI.

And when Yace joins the party, Houphouet is already consecrated as the figurehead of nationalism in French West Africa. On 19 October 1946,

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in fact, Bamako (capital of present Mali) is the site of the constitutive congress of the RDA (African Democratic Rally), which raises him to its chief post. The Ivorian party thus becomes the PDCI-RDA (Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast, section of the RDA).

Philippe Yace will mobilize all his efforts to catch up with history. Haloed because of his status as a teacher, already endowed with a firm sense of authority--he is, moreover, proud of his military past--Yace first becomes chief secretary of the subsection of Aboisso, where he has resumed his job of teacher. Even before the 2d Party Congress (scheduled for 1950) is held, he is elected in July 1949 as chief secretary of the Teachers Syndicate of the Ivory Coast and establishes himself in Abidjan.

"The Man In Front"

Once in the capital, he increases in militancy, while Houphouet the rebel is being pursued by the colonial administration. Chief secretary of the subsection of the workers districts of Treichville-Koumassi and Port-Bouet, he will scale the rungs of the ladder on the double. General councillor, territorial councillor, then full councillor of French West Africa, the regime of internal autonomy (1958-1960) propels him to be deputy to the constituent assembly of the Ivory Coast and in 1959 senator of the Community (French). Upon independence at last, in 1960, Philippe Yace attains the presidency of the Ivorian National Assembly--a post which he will occupy for 20 years. He is in the shadow of Houphouet, who knew how to push him to the front of the scene by entrusting him in 1959 with the general secretariat of the party for the interim; he will not be the titular incumbent until 1965, at the close of the 4th Congress.

Thus, in the rhythm of the congresses, easily embracing the swells of Ivorian political life which swamp the companions of Houphouet's first hour one by one, Philippe Yace will accumulate more and more titles, if not powers. President of the High Court of Justice, secretary general of the party, president of the National Assembly, he appears in 1970 to be best placed of the candidates at the moment when, during the 5th Congress, Houphouet-Boigny mentions his succession for the first time. Formal confirmation will come in May 1975. An amendment to the constitution entrusts the interim presidency of the Republic to the president of the National Assembly in case of a vacancy of power.

One does not become--or long remain--number two without damage. According to one of those trenchant formulas which the Abidjanis like to use, Yace thought he was the "man behind Houphouet," but in reality he was only the "man in front"--the one who receives the blows and sacrifices himself on the altar of unpopularity. At the beginning of 1963, for example after the creation of a Court of State Safety, it is Philippe Yace who launches the "witch hunt." On 14 January, at the end of a marathon meeting of party dignitaries at Yamoussoukro, he announces, in

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substance: "The political situation has been corrupted by subversive activities and the Ivorian leaders reaffirm the illegality of the Communist Party. The PDCI has decided as a consequence to purify all sectors of the nation."

In the aftermath, the knife falls. Three ministers are dismissed: Amadou Kone (health), Charles Donwahi (agriculture), Joachim Bony (education). The parliamentary immunity of seven deputies is lifted. Almost 100 persons are arrested, including a customs officer, Captain Akany, and a member of the gendarmerie. The first of the housecleaning so dear to Houphouet has taken place. Its executor is Philippe Yace, president that year of the High Court of Justice.

The Bete Noire

Seven months later, while Houphouet gets in a long trip abroad (from May to August), it is again through Philippe Yace's voice that the party strikes. On 26 August 1963, two days before the return of the "Old man" to Abidjan, he calls upon the people to be vigilant and announces the creation...of a party militia. Ten days later, on 5 September, the political office announces that investigations of certain citizens for "suspect activities" have been ordered. Yace is mainly after the Free Masons. On 10 September, a new housecleaning: seven ministers (and not the least important) fall. Among them Jean-Baptiste Mockey (agriculture), Jean Banny (defense), Koffi Gadeau (interior).

Jean-Baptiste Mockey had for a long time appeared to be the "dauphin"; he was formerly secretary general of the party--and thus Yace's predecessor--and vice-premier (resigned) in 1959, before returning to the government to take the [Ministry of] Interior, then Agriculture. Dismissed, arrested, he is condemned to death in January 1965, but will be pardoned before being freed, in May 1967. He returns to the political office in October 1975 and to the government in March 1976 as minister of state charged with health. His rehabilitation has not caused him to "forgive and forget" about the 10 years of internal exile. And, if one believes those close to him, in 1980 still Jean-Baptiste Mockey says in private: "I want to get back the party secretariat. It is a post which was stolen from me in 1960." There is an obstacle to getting back: Philippe Yace, bete noire of the old guard.

A Hatchet Man

The young wolves feel no more tenderly toward the master of the PDCI. His military methods, his abrupt tone--"often provoking" according to a former minister--his way of transmitting presidential instructions without nuances have made of Philippe Yace an anti-technocrat and anti-apparatchik, characterized more by a taste for authority than by a sense of order and efficiency. Since the beginning of the 1970's he is said to be in

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competition with the all-powerful minister of finance and the economy, Henri Konan Bedie, for the succession to Houphouet. At the time, in fact, the rumor circulates that Felix Houphouet-Boigny is tempted by the example of Senegalese President Leopold Sedar Senghor, who took a technocrat in the person of Abdou Diouf for prime minister. But, at least constitutionally, it is Philippe Yace who gains in 1975 when, as president of the National Assembly, he is charged, by virtue of his position, with the interim presidency of the Republic in case of a vacancy.

Nothing more normal, indeed, and the interested party protests his good faith: "It is the president of the National Assembly," he tells us in September 1975, "who assures continuity during the interim and not Philippe Yace." Nevertheless! Rightly or wrongly, Yace will appear to be the hatchet man of technocrats. A reputation (doubtless unjustified) which will be reinforced in 1977 when three of the famous technocrats leave the government: Henri Konan Bedie (economy), Mohammed Tiekoura Diawara (plan), and Abdoulaye Sawadogo (agriculture); following by the mandarin of foreign affairs, Usher Assouan. Backbiters will maintain that, to succeed Houphouet, Philippe Yace is from then on "alone on the triumphal road"--an allusion to a grandiose project for modernization of Abidjan, today put on the back burner.

Bad Decision

But, from congress to congress, the political leaders--including the dauphin--are aging and wearing out. The unpuncturable Houphouet considers that another hour will sound before his departure: that of democratization. And on 7 December 1979, he lets this statement drop: "The FDCI-RDA, if it wants to live, I should say survive as the only party, must respect the elementary rules of true democracy." It is a warning shot against a leadership accused, contrarily, of not having respected these rules. And Abidjan recollects all his reproaches against the party barons. In the first row of whom stands Philippe Yace.

In the heart of the foreign community (a fifth of the population), they assert that Yace cultivates a nationalism approaching xenophobia. In 1968 it is he who is supposed to have pushed for expulsion of the Nigerian immigrants and the closing of Ivorian frontiers; in 1975 it is he who, to the great detriment of Lebanese-Syrian businessmen, insists on the urgency of "ivorization" of the economic apparatus.

In the popular districts of Abidjan, they have found yet another "bad decision": presiding at the party national council's meeting at the beginning of October 1979, he announced that the Ivory Coast would offer hospitality to Jean-Bedel Bokassa--a measure of which the least that could be said is that it was not welcomed enthusiastically. And for which, as usual, Philippe Yace is saddled with the responsibility.

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The theme of democratization, launched by Houphouet in December 1979 and confirmed on 12 June 1980, has thus tolled like a stroke of doom for Yace's career. Against a man who has become unpopular, democracy may in fact appear to be the only absolute weapon.

Why this "putting out on the street" of a man who for 20 of his 60 years has played the role of faithful second? Did Yace start to become dangerous for Houphouet? Certainly not. Because, to his unpopularity he adds weakness in regional representation. In a country with 70 ethnic groups where a politician is characterized less by his opinions than by his origins, a Yace could not seriously believe in his star. An Aladian, member of a minority among minorities, he did not hold his own in the balancing act performed all the time by Baoules and Betes, which is arbitered by the greatest among the small--Dioulas and Senoufos. Which no doubt explains why Philippe Yace has always counted only to the trust of the "Old Man." But, "man of the Old Man," he has doubtless made the mistake of believing that it was enough for him to wait. In 20 years, he has not actually built up a group of loyal followers. This would have been dangerous, it must be said, in a state modeled on the traditional chefferie and whose only master would never have accepted even a semblance of competition. But this wait-and-see policy has used up Yace.

Honorary Post

Of course, Houphouet-Boigny is not a man to drop a faithful man definitively and without scruple. He has even proved the contrary. Magnanimous, he has often rehabilitated those whom he has allowed to be condemned. Philippe Yace's merits should make him worth an honorary post. The vice-presidency of the Republic in the opinions of some. The honorary presidency or the permanent secretariat of the party according to others. But in any case, he loses his dauphinate.

This will be the result of the 7th PDCI Congress. Philippe Yace himself stated it in 1975: "Every five years, at each congress, the Ivory Coast has seen political overturns." The year 1975 saw his consecration. Five years later, 1980 will see his departure.

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DISSOLUTION OF MOST PARASTATAL COMPANIES REPORTED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 1 Sep 80 pp 45-47

[Article by Jonathan Kolela entitled: "Mission Ended"]

[Text] Much has been said of the "Ivorian miracle." Time has now come for reorganization and reexamination.

"AVB": Bandama Valley Development Authority. As of the end of October, Ivorians, fond of acronyms, will have to drop the above from their vocabulary. Together with 11 other state-owned or partially state-owned companies, AVB, created during a period of continued economic expansion, had ceased to exist on 12 June. The reason given by authorities is: "Its mission is ended."

When one is aware of the Abidjan leaders' taste for subtle, if not ambiguous, statements, the expression "mission ended," also applied to ARSO (Authority for the Development of the South-West), may mean that these state-owned companies failed in their mission, as well as the contrary, although the first interpretation is the most widely accepted in the Ivorian capital. Out of a total 36 state-owned companies only 7 will be left: Air Ivoire, CSSPPA (Fund for Stabilization and Price Support of Agricultural Products), Palminindustrie, Petroci (oil fuels), Sitram (maritime cargo), Sodemi (millet production), Sodesucre. Others are either disappearing or undergoing considerable statutory changes, some are becoming administrative government establishments (EPA), others industrial and commercial government establishments (EPIC), others still are "dis-assimilated" and returned to their former role of mixed economy companies.

This is the case for BNDA (National Bank for Agricultural Development) and CCI (Ivory Coast Credit), partially state-owned companies until recently but enjoying the status of state-owned companies. BNEC (National Bank for Savings and Loans) deprived by the government of the management of its housing fund, 12 billion francs CFA, and repeatedly criticized, also returns to its former activities as a private bank, while BDI (Industrial Development Bureau), OPEI and the Guarantee Fund for Ivorian Enterprises, the activities of which were overlapping, will merge to form a more dynamic entity.

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Whether EPA's or EPIC's, the new organizations are granted somewhat less freedom of management than the former state-owned companies: thus, although they retain their own legal status and distinctive administrative structure (therefore an autonomous budget subject to a priori and a posteriori audit), and have been granted more flexible procedures in some cases, the national government establishments (EPA and EPIC) will nevertheless be subject to tighter control.

The boards of directors which were responsible for management are replaced by management advisory committees presided over directly by the appropriate minister or his representative. These new organizations are expected to operate with more strictness and a higher sense of responsibility. Strictness also should be applied to the state-owned companies (seven, mentioned above) which retain this status. While their boards of directors will continue their management role as in the past, supervision will be exercised much more closely by means of a ministerial oversight commission which will meet periodically and thus provide the ministers with better means for planning and executing their prescribed missions.

Observers are therefore asking themselves whether the purpose now proclaimed--economic reorganization--is not actually a front for new directions in economic policy, comprising a decrease of influence for the public sector and a strong recovery for the private sector. This question is not without foundation because a closer look does not reveal any significant differences in management achievement, as one might expect, between the companies purely and simply eliminated and those retained.

Two examples will suffice to prove it: the case of Sodesucre on the one hand and that of PAC distribution chain on the other: the first was kept while it was, as a matter of fact, the object of sharp criticisms sometimes from those who had been its most enthusiastic supporters at the time of its creation; the second was eliminated although, according to some well-informed economists, it was not only viable, but vital, to compete with private capital in such a crucial sector as retail distribution.

The organization in 1974 of Sodesucre, state-owned company responsible for the promotion of sugar development, was political as much as economic in purpose: it was meant to encourage the creation of economic activities in the north of the country, i.e., a region which had so far been receiving little reward from the national economic boom, therefore establishing a center of development capable of providing jobs and thus checking population migrations to the more advantaged regions of the center (Bouaké) and, particularly, the Abidjan area.

The political objective of redistributing the national wealth fairly among the regions was fulfilled, at least in major part. On the other hand, the economic choice underlying the political project--i.e., the decision to make the sugar cane and sugar industry the basis for the development of the north--seems, in retrospect, to have been an unwise idea, not to say a completely absurd one.

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There is no need to insist beyond measure on the fact, recognized somewhat bitterly by Ivorians today, that "Western partners responsible for setting up the sugar installations behaved in a disgraceful manner and ignored our interests." It is known indeed that imported equipment was almost systematically overpriced and that in some cases the final cost of the complexes exceeded the initial estimates by 40 percent, "more than twice, an engineer told us, the standards usually acceptable in that type of contract." One former manager (expatriate) of the Ferke 1 sugar complex felt so free within the budgetary constraints that while on business trips between Abidjan and his northern factory he had a second vehicle follow him should his own break down.

Such cost inflation is generally mentioned only because it came on top of, on the one hand, the questionable choice of sugar production in a region little suited for it, and, on the other, the poor conditions, apart from any other factors, prevailing in the world sugar market where the price covers barely half of the present production cost in the Ivory Coast. Consequently, authorities were forced to backtrack and to abandon, at least momentarily, 4 of the 10 planned complexes.

Concerning the PAC distribution chain, it only need be said that it was put into operation when Konan Bedie was minister of economy, with the purpose of opening the small retail business field to Ivorian capital and businessmen, to this day largely the appanage of Lebanese and European businessmen. There is no doubt that many errors were made in the management of this chain. However, did they suffice to justify the decision taken on June 12?

The example of both Sodesucre and PAC demonstrates on several accounts the difficulties encountered presently by the Ivorian economy and the solutions which are taking shape. From the first example one will note that the leaders having chosen economic liberalism have not always been able to distinguish clearly between it and "laissez-faire." This has allowed foreign capital and businessmen, already very much in place in the private sector, to exercise a growing influence even in the public sector. The situation is so critical today that despite the wish often expressed by the national leaders to "Ivorianize" the economy and the administration, foreign assistance personnel (mainly French) keep an upper hand on entire segments of these sectors.

This problem will probably be at the heart of the discussions of the next conference of the PDCI--RDA [Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast--African Democratic Rally], during the second half of September. Authorities, aware of this situation, explain it by the penury of national management personnel and by the lack of professionalism widespread among some of them.

Significant in this respect Sodesucre is also an example of an economic growth admittedly rapid, undoubtedly the most rapid in black Africa during

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the past 20 years, but undisciplined and poorly controlled. Because of this growth the country now has one of the best highway networks, one of the highest numbers of automobiles per capita, is the first world producer of cocoa and the third of coffee, and rates high for half-a-dozen other agricultural products (not to mention the imminent production of oil); but this growth while giving birth to a new wealthy minority has at the same time brought to light a poverty still too widespread. Finally, the example of PAC is significant in that it reveals what might be considered procrastination when it came down to deciding which economic policy to implement.

President Houphouët-Boigny never did hide that having chosen economic liberalism once for all, he still intended to hand over the control of the economy to his fellow-citizens, by gradually returning to them, as was the case in Japan at the beginning of the century, enterprises created by the state or with its assistance.

This desire--although part of an option which may seem to favor a certain category of the population--counters foreign capital's option of trying to maintain control of the Ivorian economy. The elimination of PAC, which can only please foreign competitors such as CFAO and SCOA [French Company of West Africa and West African Trading Company], as well as other measures in the same vein, run the risk of appearing as a contradiction of the Ivorian president's wishes.

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IVORY COAST

BUDGET FIGURES FOR ELECTRICAL POWER GIVEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Sep 80 p 2243

[Article]

[Text] The 1978-1979 fiscal year for EECI [Electric Energy of the Ivory Coast] was marked by the entering into service of the Taabo plant on the Bandama.

Energy production reached 1,544.2 GWh, increasing 12.8 percent over the previous period. Hydro-electric production grew to 454.8 GWh (up by 122.6 percent), corresponding to 29.5 percent of total production, the Taabo power plant accounting for two-thirds of this. Though the level of thermal production has been higher (70.5 percent compared to 85 percent in 1977-1978), the decline should be significantly accentuated in the course of the next period after the Buyo power plant goes into service.

Energy sales totalled 1,322.9 GWh (up 16.4 percent; they provided 29.7 CFA [francs] in revenues (up 14.1 percent), including 19 billion for the urban division of Abidjan.

By categories, 44.4 percent of energy sales were on low tension, 47.6 percent at medium tension, and 8 percent at high tension, and the average sale prices per kilowatt-hour were, respectively: 27.5 (low tension), 19.9 (medium tension), and 9.6 CFA francs (high tension). High tension consumption grew by 13.7 percent primarily because of the putting into service of the second textile unit of Ets R. Gonfreville at Bouake.

On 30 September 1979 low-tension customers had increased to 235,130 (up 15 percent over the end of September 1978), medium-tension consumers numbered 1,232 (up 14.5 percent), the number of industries utilizing high tension remaining at 3. The length of the network totalled 10,780 km (up 10.8 percent.)

After taking into preliminary account the installations at the Taabo dam, the raw value of the permanent facilities grew from 114.6 billions in 1978 to 174.1 billion CFA in 1979; allowing amortization, the net value is 130.4 billion.

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During the period, EECI's capital in issued stock grew in value from 2.8 billion to 3 billion CFA. Medium and long term indebtedness stood at 57.2 billion CFA on 30 September 1979.

Profits were weighed down by financing costs (4 billion CFA) and by an amortization endowment that was increased because of the new facility at Taabo (2.6 billion). The resulting deficit stood at (-)2.3 billion CFA, bringing to 4.5 billion the losses at the end of September 1979.

At the end of the period, active personnel totalled 3,109 (up 1.9 percent), and the total of wages, costs, and imposts totalled 9.6 billion CFA (up 11.4 percent).

Mr Kanga Konan, the mayor of Abidjan, assumes the presidency of EECI, whose is Mr Lambert Konan.

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IVORY COAST

DEVELOPMENT BANK BUDGETARY FIGURES PUBLISHED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Sep 80 p 2243

[Article--passages between slantlines originally published with emphasis]

[Text] In the course of the 1978-1979 fiscal period, /Ivorian Industrial Development Bank (BIDI)/ made available 5.8 billion CFA [francs] in credits (up 3 percent over the preceding period) to some 31 enterprises (17 continuing projects and 14 new ones).

The activity of the period was divided up into 10 branches, including food industries (21 percent), chemical industries and oily substances (19 percent), transport and distribution (11 percent), mechanical and electrical industries and metal-work (10 percent), civil engineering and production of construction materials (5 percent), and textile and clothing industries (4 percent), etc.

Among the new beneficiaries are the following notable ones:

--/Ivorian Industrial Printing-Office (3I)/ [sic]: loan of 300 million CFA to facilitate 940 million in investments.

--/African Mineral Water Company (SADEM)/" loan of 300 million CFA (750 million investment).

--/African Computer Company (SOCA)/: loan of 190 million (340 million investment).

--/South-West Cement Company (SOCIM)/: loan of 200 million CFA (10 percent of the investment).

BIDI also completed and increased various disbursements made in the course of previous periods, including, for this period:

--/Blohorn SA/--oilworks, soap-works, lipo-chemistry: 700 million CFA.

--/Ivorian Fertilizer Company (SIVENG)/: 1.1 billion CFA.

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--/Ivorian Automobile Manufacturing Assembly Company (SIFMA)/: 407 million.

--/Ivorian Cotton-workers (COTIVO)/: 62.5 million.

--/Ivory Coast Industrial Textiles Union (UTEXI)/: 22.5 million.

--/Ivorian Industrial Textiles Company (SIVOITEX)/: 176 million.

Since 1965, BIDI has distributed 40.4 billion CFA in long and medium term credit and taken capital shares (1 billion CFA) in 389 operations. The principal beneficiary sectors are: industrial textiles and clothing (13 percent), food industry (11.6 percent), transport and distribution (10.6 percent), chemistry and fatty substances (9.7 percent), wood industry (9.3 percent), services (9 percent), electricity, machinery and metalwork (8.2 percent), fishing and freezing (5.8 percent), buildings and public works (5.7 percent), and hotels and tourism (5 percent), etc.

In terms of geographic distribution, Abidjan is in the leading position with 81 percent, the central region coming in for 8.6 percent.

As of 30 September 1979, loans out totalled 16.5 billion CFA. Among the debtors, 15 were having problems, their debts totalling 1.8 billion CFA.

Allowing for 218 million CFA in depreciation, the value of posted shares stood at 552 million. [sic]

For use in its operations BIDI has 2.1 billion CFA of capital, medium and long-term loan funds (16 billion), and a rediscount facility with the /Central Bank of West African States/.

Its capital is divided this way: Ivorian state (21.1 percent), private Ivorian partners (4.5 percent), Central Bank of West African States (12.4 percent), /Central Fund for Economic Cooperation/ (10.7 percent), /French External Trade Bank/ (6.4 percent), /International Finance Corporation/ (7.1 percent), and the balance among various foreign financial establishments and Ivorian banks.

Mr Jean-Baptiste Amethier assumes the duties of governor of BIDI, whose general management is assumed by Mr Alphonse Diby, deputy administrator and general manager.

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KENYA

BRIEFS

ISRAELI COOPERATION--Kenya is considering cancellation of its military cooperation with Israel as regards the training of civilian and military cadres. The Arap Moi government, which wishes to improve its relations with the Arab countries, has already authorized the opening of a PLO office in Nairobi. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Oct 80 p 47] 8143

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LIBERIA

SAMUEL DOE SAID TO BE EXPERT POLITICIAN

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Sep 80 p 29

[Article by Carlos Moore: "A Western Mengistu?"]

[Text] Because of the bloodiness of his eruption onto the political scene on 12 April 1980, he has been treated like a leper. Quarantined by moderate Africa (how should Sekou Toure be classified, who is also shunning him?), Samuel Doe was excluded from the June OAU summit meeting in Freetown.

There is something disturbing in the methods of this young non-commissioned officer, sometimes known as "the assassin." He can be blamed for the crime of aggravated lese majeste: the execution of William Tolbert, who was not only head of the state of Liberia but also acting president of the OAU. Doe had cold bloodedly killed the symbolic head of the entire African continent. But where were those fellow who wept so for William Tolbert when that one massacred more than 100 demonstrators in Monrovia on 14 April 1979?

Now Samuel Doe, the guilty, has come out of isolation. He cocks a snoot at the moderates. He's made friends who aren't repulsed by shaking his hand. Perhaps because their hands have been dipped in blood too in the name of establishing a new revolutionary order on the rubble of the old and unjust regimes. Arriving at Addis Ababa on 26 August, his first official visit since the coup d'etat, Doe was received with full honors, including being called 'brother' by Ethiopia's strong man. Mengistu Haile Mariam, past master of the art of settling accounts expeditiously. What better master?

"Any counter revolutionary element taken in the act of undermining the revolution will be immediately executed!" Who is speaking? Mengistu? No, Samuel Doe, returning from Monrovia on 1 September 1980, after a brief stop at Dar-es-Salaam. Some days later, he also promised the execution post to cabinet members who "hold secret meetings behind the back of the Council for Popular Redemption." (CRP)

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What seems to be involved is a warning to two civilian personalities of the extreme left whom he had brought into the government following the coup d'etat in order to neutralize them, and they are now being tempted to outflank him on the left. Such is the case of Togba Nah Tipoh, currently minister of Planning and Economic Affairs and director of the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA). Such is the case also of Gabriel Bacchus Matthews, minister of Foreign Affairs and head of the Peoples Progressive Party. Both are consolidating their positions in the army. The commander in chief of the armed forces, General (formerly staff sergeant) Thomas Quiwompka is said to favor an acceleration of the revolutionary process.

It is not excluded that Doe has decided to take up his allies/rivals speedily in penetrating the African revolutionary camp. For if Samuel Konan Doe is not a good theoretician as are his leftist rivals, he has shown himself to be an expert at political poker and to date he has shuffled, cut and dealt without flaw. Now it seems he's going to play a Mengistu, the others being free to bet on Atnafu Abate (second in command of DERC, "executed" in 1975).

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LIBERIA

BRIEFS

COURTING OF LIBERIAN PRESIDENT--The recent "shift to the left" of Sargeant-President Samuel K. Doe seems to be working in his favor. Assiduously courted by Cuba and the socialist bloc, with the USSR at the head of the pack (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1028), the Liberian military regime has just resumed relations with an important backer: the European Economic Community (EEC) whose aid to Liberia is said to total \$50 million in 1980. The EEC is thus following the lead of the United States which has just granted Monrovia \$20 million; and normalization with many moderate African states is moving forward. After the coup d'etat on 17 April 1980 against the late President William Tolbert, these states had put Samuel Doe and his companions in quarantine. The break with the EEC goes back to 17 June 1980 and resulted from the Liberian army's intervention in the compound of the French embassy in Monrovia to arrest the son of the assassinated chief of state who had taken refuge there. At that time, the EEC had suspended relations with Liberia and stated that they would not be resumed so long as the African states of the ECOWAS "refused to have anything to do with" Samuel Doe. However, by approaching the Soviets, Doe doubtless disturbed Western Europe enough to cause it to resume its courtship of him. His minister of planning and economic affairs, Togba Nah Tipoteh, went to Brussels to negotiate with the EEC, then traveled to Paris to obtain French financial assistance. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Oct 80 p 32] 8143

CUBANS MAY TRAIN ARMY--Samuel Doe anticipates appealing to the Cubans for officer training in the Liberian army now being reorganized and to bring its manpower up to 5,000 or 8,000 men. He would have made contact with Cuban officers in Ethiopia during his stay in Addis Ababa. [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Sep 80 p 5] 8860

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MAURITIUS

ECONOMY'S DEPENDENCE ON SUGAR DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Sep 80 pp 2169-2171

[Report: "Mauritius: An Economy Which Depends On Sugar"]

[Text] The 1980/1981 Sugar Campaign

The consequences of hurricanes Claudette and Hyacinthe will eliminate any profit which Mauritius could have from the current rise in world sugar prices.

Whereas the production optimum is in the vicinity of 700,000 metric tons, on 8 August last the Chamber of Agriculture gave its official estimate of the 1980-1981 sugar crop as totaling 500,000 tons. In fact, after one month of harvesting, 99,530 tons of sugar had been processed as compared with 187,426 tons in 1979. The shortage is the result of the reduction in the tonnage of ground sugarcane (1,021,000 tons versus 1,815,000 tons), as well as a lower extraction rate (9.74 percent presently as compared with 10.33 percent at the same time last year).

After supplying the domestic market (about 42,000 tons) Mauritius will be unable to meet the 500,000 ton quota in guaranteed prices allocated to it by the sugar protocol appended to the EEC-ACP [European Economic Community-African, Caribbean and Pacific countries] conventions of Lome I and II; therefore, it will be forced to invoke the clause of absolute necessity in order to preserve its quota. That situation had not occurred since 1975, the year of hurricane Cervaise.

Foreign Trade

The difficulties of the sugar sector would adversely affect the already negative balance of trade of the Island of Mauritius.

In fact, even though the contribution of sugar and molasses to export revenue may have been clearly declining over the past 10 years (96.2 percent in 1968 and 67.4 percent in 1978), they are still bringing the country most of its foreign exchange.

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The development of manufactured goods, clothing in particular (+415 percent in 5 years) was the result of the opening and development of a free export zone which includes today 90 enterprises. According to the annual report of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry the overall turnover of these enterprises rose by 13 percent in 1979, reaching 550 million rupees.

The diversification of exports has led to a diversification of destinations.

In 1978 Great Britain remained the most important client of Mauritius, since the latter is selling most of its sugar to the Tate and Lyle Company. It is followed by the United States and France. The EEC countries account for about 85 percent of the exports of Mauritius.

This concentration (accounting for over 90 percent with six countries) is repeated, to a lesser extent, on the level of imports.

The study of the nature of goods imported in the first half of 1979 shows a resumption of food purchases, which had been declining, and a jump in the purchases of petroleum goods. Conversely, the setting of quotas and of prohibited custom duties (from 125 to 200 percent) have resulted in a sharp decline in imports of transport goods.

With that exception, the sum total of manufactured goods has been slowly rising with the growth of revenue and the aspiration to a better life on the part of the Mauritian population.

Comparing exports with imports we can see that the deficit of the balance of trade (FOB/CIF) has been growing with every passing year. Starting with a surplus in 1974 (+93 million or 105 percent), the balance has been declining, reaching a record-setting deficit of 1.3 billion in 1979, or a cover of 62.5 percent only.

This growing difference has affected the equilibrium of the balance of payments, exhausted foreign currency reserves, and led to the October 1979 devaluation.*

The Balance of Payments

The balance of payments is largely determined by the circulation of goods, since the circulation of capital had accounted for a very small share until 1978, since investment financing came mostly from local resources.

It shows that, in a way, Mauritius was the victim of the sugar boom of 1974, for it triggered the simultaneous growth of imports and exports.

* Of 30 percent on 23 October 1979. One Mauritius rupee = 0.10 SDR = 0.55 French francs.

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In 1976 the balance was disturbed, for the rhythm of imports has been maintained, whereas that of exports has been stagnating since then.

Let us note that the balance of services shows a double shift: It is penalized by the shipping costs of goods, assessed at 20 percent of FOB price of imports, or 600 million in 1979, but supported by income from tourism: 275 million rupees brought in 1979 by 129,000 tourists.

The massive growth of long-term investment capital (mainly public monies) shows the difficulty experienced by the Mauritian government to finance the investments stipulated in the five-year plan from its equipment budget.

The 1980-1981 Budget

The Mauritius finance laws clearly distinguish between the current operation budget (recurrent expenditures) and the capital budget.

The figures for the fiscal year show a slight deficit in the operational budget and a much higher figure for the investments budget.

The Operational Budget

The operational budget revenue has the following breakdown:

Breakdown of Current Revenue
(in million rupees)

Direct taxes	414
Indirect taxes	1,459
Revenue from public production services	93
Revenue from public infrastructures	72
Interest and royalties	86
Repayment of loans	65
Property and other income	11
Total	<u>2,200</u>

In this area we cannot fail to be impressed by the massive increase in debt servicing, which rose from 200 million in 1978-1979 to 361 million in 1979-1980 and 461 million for 1980-1981 (+28 percent), and the size of social expenditures. The other major expenditures, naturally, are for education and health. Conversely, the defense budget is very moderate, for this function is assumed by the police alone.

The estimated deficit will be lower compared with the previous fiscal year (93.6 million rupees as against 153 million rupees). However, it is expected that it will be higher than anticipated, for the readjustment of wages, contractually negotiated with the trade unions (+11 percent as of

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1 July 1980 as partial compensation for the galloping inflation (+40 percent) which followed the devaluation) has not been included.

Relative Size of Main Current Expenditures
(in million rupees and in percent of total expenditures)

	Million Rupees	Per- centage
Debt servicing	461	20
Education	362	16
Health	182	8
Rice and flour subsidy	180	8
Social security	179	8
Police	130	6
Local settlements	110	5
Civil pensions	99	4
Ministry of Equipment	85	4

The Equipment Budget

Eighty percent of this budget will be covered by revenue. This has worried some experts who are already concerned by the high level of indebtedness.

In terms of resources it calls for the following (in million rupees):

Subsidies	1.5
Domestic borrowing	160
Foreign loans	651.1
Various resources	52.8
Total	865.4

On the other side of the balance, the 1,490,600,000 rupees of capital expenditures will have the following breakdown (in million rupees):

Loans for planned projects	506
Administrative capital expenditures	944
Reserve	40

In the final account, despite the concern for rebalancing the current budget, in 1980-1981 the Mauritius public finances would be unable to avoid the dilemma shared by a number of Third World countries: Either invest and increase financial deficits or stop the growth.

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Sugar Production and Sales
(thousand metric tons)

PRODUCTION ET VENTE DE SUCRE				
(en milliers de tonnes métriques)				
	1977-1978	1978-1979	1979-1980	
1) Production	665.5	665.2	687.2	
2) Vente locale	40.8	40.3	42	
3) Exportations	626	624.7 (1)	645.2 (2)	
4) dont :				
5) CEE	510	507.2	507.5 (2)	
6) (1) Y compris 6 860 t stockées au titre de l'International Sugar Agreement.				
7) (2) Chiffres provisoires.				

Key: 1. Production 6. Including 6,860 tons stockpiled on the basis of the International Sugar Agreement

2. Domestic sales

3. Exports

4. Of which

5. EEC

7. Preliminary figures

Destination of Exports
(in percentage)

DESTINATION DES EXPORTATIONS				
(en pourcentage)				
	1976	1977	1978	
1) Grande-Bretagne	69.3	66.8	64.9	
2) États-Unis	5.8	6.0	8.8	
3) France	9.2	7.8	7.3	
4) Belgique	1.2	3.5	4.5	
5) Canada	3.8	2.9	2.2	
6) Pays-Bas	0.7	2.2	2.2	
7) RFA	2.7	3.2	2.2	
8) Afrique du Sud	2.2	2.3	2.0	
9) Divers	5.1	5.3	5.9	

Key: 1. Great Britain 6. The Netherlands

2. United States 7. FRG

3. France 8. South Africa

4. Belgium 9. Other countries

5. Canada

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Development and Structure by Export Item
(in millions of rupees FOB)

ÉVOLUTION ET STRUCTURE PAR PRODUIT DES EXPORTATIONS (en millions de roupies FOB)							
		1976		1977		1978	
		Rs	%	Rs	%	Rs	%
		—	—	—	—	—	—
2)	Sucre	1 322	74,7	1 429	70,0	1 305	65,7
3)	Mélasses	32	1,8	41	2,0	34	1,7
4)	Thé	29	1,6	44	2,1	55	2,8
5)	Poissons	19	1,1	32	1,6	32	1,6
6)	Vêtements	205	11,6	273	13,4	313	15,7
7)	Textiles	17	0,9	56	2,7	39	1,9
8)	Composants électroniques	62	3,5	59	2,9	54	2,7
9)	Divers	51	4,7	76	5,3	121	7,9
10)	Réexportation	34	—	32	—	34	—
11)	Total	1 770	—	2 041	—	1 987	—
12)	(Les réexportations sont exclues pour le calcul des pourcentages.)						
							1 ^{er} sem. 1979
							Rs
							—
							615
							28
							27
							12
							169
							24
							28
							55
							20
							1 068

- Key: 1. First half of 1979 7. Textiles
 2. Sugar 8. Electronic components
 3. Molasses 9. Various
 4. Tea 10. Reexports
 5. Fish 11. Total
 6. Clothing 12. Reexports not included in percentage figures

Origin of Imports (in percentage)

PROVENANCE DES IMPORTATIONS (en pourcentage)			
	1976	1977	1978
1) Grande-Bretagne	—	—	—
2) France	16,2	17,8	14,9
3) Afrique du Sud	10,1	10,8	11,0
4) Australie	9,9	10,6	11,7
5) RFA	4,8	5,3	5,5
6) Inde	6,0	4,9	4,1
7) Kenya	3,8	3,2	4,1
8) États-Unis	2,3	2,9	2,6
9) Japon	3,0	2,6	3,2
10) Iran	8,1	7,5	5,9
11) Bahrein	6,7	4,4	2,7
	0,9	4,0	5,1

- Key: 1. Great Britain 5. FRG 9. Japan
 2. France 6. India 10. Iran
 3. South Africa 7. Kenya 11. Bahrein
 4. Australia 8. United States

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Development and Structure by Imported Goods
(in thousand rupees CIF)

ÉVOLUTION ET STRUCTURE PAR PRODUIT DES IMPORTATIONS (en milliers de Rs CIF)									
		1976		1977		1978		1) 1 ^{re} sem. 1979	
		Rs	%	Rs	%	Rs	%	Rs	%
2)	Produits alimentaires	487	20.0	582	20.0	697	23.0	348	22.0
3)	Boissons et tabac	19	0.9	32	1.1	23	0.7	13	0.8
4)	Matières premières indus.	64	2.7	96	3.3	105	3.4	52	3.3
5)	Pétroles et lubrifiants	209	8.7	275	9.3	281	9.1	193	12.9
6)	Huiles animales et végétales	81	3.4	79	2.7	86.4	2.8	45	2.8
7)	Produits chimiques	168	7.0	212	7.2	202	6.6	113	7.0
8)	Produits manufacturés	632	26.2	790	28.8	858	27.9	353	28.2
9)	Machines et matériels de transport ..	580	24.1	679	23.0	572.4	18.6	256	15.9
10)	Produits manufacturés divers	160	6.6	192	6.5	233	7.6	131	7.2
11)	Divers	9	0.2	13	0.4	19	0.6	6	0.3
Total 12)		2 409	-	2 951	-	3 076	-	1 610	-

- Key: 1. First half of 1979
 2. Food products
 3. Beverages and tobacco
 4. Industrial raw materials
 5. Petroleum and lubricants
 6. Animal and vegetable oils
 7. Chemicals
 8. Manufactured goods
 9. Transport machinery and materials
 10. Various manufactured goods
 11. Various
 12. Total

Balance of Trade
(in million rupees)

BALANCE COMMERCIALE (en millions de roupies)					
		1976	1977	1978	1979 (2)
1)	Importations CIF	2 409	2 951	3 076	3 400
2)	Exportations FOB (1)	1 835	2 134	2 073	2 125
3)	Balance	- 574	- 817	- 1 003	- 1 275
4)	(1) Y compris le soulage des navires.				
5)	(2) Chiffre provisoire				

- Key: 1. Imports CIF
 2. Exports FOB
 3. Balance
 4. Including ship bunkering
 5. Preliminary figures

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Summary of 1980-1981 Finance Law
(million rupees)

LOI DE FINANCES RÉSUMÉE POUR 1980-1981			
(en millions de roupies)			
1) Opérations courantes		2) Opérations en capital	
3) Recettes	2 200.0		865.4
4) Dépenses	2 293.6		1 490.6
5) Déficit	- 93.6		- 625.2
6) Déficit total			- 718.8

Key: 1. Current operations	4. Expenditures
2. Capital operations	5. Deficit
3. Revenues	6. Total deficit

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Balance of Payments
(million rupees)

		BALANCE DES PAIEMENTS (en millions de roupies)			
		1976	1977	1978	1979 estimat.
1)	Exportations (FOB)	1 768	2 030	1 969	2 340
2)	Importations (FOB)	- 2 047	- 2 418	- 2 580	2 980
3)	= Balance commerciale	- 279	- 388	- 611	- 675
4)	+ Balance des services	- 6	- 208	- 209	- 275
5)	= Balance des biens et services	- 285	- 596	- 820	- 950
6)	+ Balance des transferts sans contre- partie	42	84	85	100
7)	= Balances des opérations cour- rantes	- 243	- 512	- 735	- 850
8)	+ Mouvements de capitaux à long terme	68	101	249	200
9)	(capitaux privés)	(48)	(56)	(75)	-
10)	(capitaux publics)	(20)	(45)	(174)	-
11)	+ Allocation de DTS	-	-	-	-
12)	+ Erreurs et omissions	45	67	76	35
13)	= Balance de base	- 130	- 344	- 410	- 615
14)	- Mouvements de capitaux privés à CT	- 387 (1)	16	80	-
15)	- Mouvements de capitaux des inst. monétaires	17	78	- 28	-
16)	= Balance des paiements	- 500	- 250	- 358	- 615
17)	(1) Dont 370 millions liés à la commercialisation du sucre.				

- Key:
1. Exports (FOB)
 2. Imports (FOB)
 3. Balance of trade
 4. Balance of services
 5. Balance of goods and services
 6. Balance of noncounterpart transfers
 7. Balance of current operations
 8. Long-term movement of capitals
 9. Private capital
 10. Public capital
 11. Allocation of special drawing rights
 12. Errors and omissions
 13. Basic balance
 14. Movement of short-term private capital
 15. Movement of capital of financial institutions
 16. Balance of payments
 17. Of which 370 million related to sugar market

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Recent Development of Public Finances
(in million rupees)

ÉVOLUTION RÉCENTE DES FINANCES PUBLIQUES						
(en millions de roupies)						
		1977-1978		1978-1979		1979-1980
		1) Budget initial	2) Effectif	1) Budget initial	2) Effectif	1) Budget initial
						Effectif (provis) 2)
3) Budget de fonctionnement :						
4) Recettes :						
5) Impôts directs		318,2	349,9	383,0	391,2	410,2
6) Impôts indirects		688,7	769,1	927,2	880,9	992,0
7) Divers		138,5	143,8	189,8	214,3	236,3
8) Total		1 145,4	1 260,8	1 500,0	1 486,4	1 638,5
9) Dépenses :						
10) Dette publique (intérieure et extérieure)		126,8	153,0	162,2	190,2	170,3
11) Fonctionnement		1 115,5	1 288,3	1 429,8	1 570,8	1 638,5
12) Transfert au budget d'équipement		-	-	10,0	-	-
13) Total		1 242,3	1 441,3	1 602,0	1 770,0	1 808,8
14) Budget d'équipement :						
15) Recettes :						
16) Recettes locales (dont emprunts)		215,4	28,8	131,6	339,0	234,5
17) Concours extérieurs		245,9	429,2	486,2	379,9	387,6
18) Total		461,3	458,0	617,8	718,9	622,1
19) Dépenses d'investissements		683,8	645,9	705,1	669,3	849,3
20) Solde		-319,4	-368,4	-189,3	-234,0	-397,5
						-336,8

- Key:
1. Initial budget
 2. Factual
 3. Operational budget
 4. Revenues
 5. Direct taxes
 6. Indirect taxes
 7. Various
 8. Total
 9. Expenditures
 10. Public debt (domestic and foreign)
 11. Operations
 12. Transfer to the equipment budget
 13. Total
 14. Equipment budget
 15. Domestic income (of which loans)
 16. Foreign aid
 17. Investment expenditures
 18. Balance

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SIERRA LEONE

BRIEFS

NATION FACING FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES--Although the International Monetary Fund has invited it to limit its expenses, Siaka Stevens' government has invested \$200 million (twice the planned amount) for the July 1980 OAU summit meeting in Freetown. Before these prestige motivated expenditures, the Sierra Leonean budget was already \$126 in deficit. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 10 Sep 80 p 40] 8860

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

IMF DEMANDS--The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is going to grant a loan of \$150-200 million to Tanzania (30-40 billion African Financial Community francs). Reportedly, such action did not take place without difficulty. Negotiations which started last year had in fact been interrupted by President Julius Nyerere, who was exasperated by the condescending attitude of the IMF emissaries. The IMF requested--even demanded--in exchange that Tanzania abandon certain of its options which the latter considers as fundamental. In addition, Tanzania would have had to adopt a series of measures which, according to President Nyerere, would have sabotaged his socialist development program. With the resumption of negotiations in June, the IMF abandoned several of its demands, while Tanzania agreed to limit its budget and to improve the profitability of state enterprises. The IMF has, therefore, made concessions. This is an entirely new policy. It is the result of severe criticism from Third World countries over the draconian conditions which the IMF was imposing upon its borrowers. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Oct 80 p 32] 8143

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TOGO

BRIEFS

SAUDI LOAN DETAILED--On 10 September 1980 the Saudi Development Fund signed two loan agreements with the Republic of Togo. According to the first agreement, the Saudi Fund grants a 33.5 million riyal loan (approximately 2.2 billion francs CFA) to Togo to finance a project for the expansion of the port of Lome. The second agreement concerns a 1,675,000 Saudi riyal loan for the financing of a feasibility and technical specification study for a soya bean agro-industrial complex. The Lome port project is aimed at increasing the port capacity through the construction of a new 250-meter long and 140-meter wide wharf. The total cost of the project is estimated at 8,768 million francs CFA, or 145 million Saudi riyals. Besides the Saudi Fund, the European Development Fund and the Federal Republic of Germany are participating in the financing of this project. The work is expected to be completed in September 1983. The feasibility project concerns production forecasts and an analysis of the soya bean and corn market, as well as determining the effect of these products on the Togolese economy. The total cost of the project is estimated at 105 million francs CFA, corresponding to 1,675,000 Saudi riyals. The study will be completed by 31 October 1980. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES in French 3 Oct 80 p 2418]

FRENCH FINANCING--Four financing agreements for a total of 577 million Malian francs were signed between the French and the Malian governments, a 25 September communique announced. These agreements include the establishment at Mali's national museum, assistance to the Malian National Post and Telecommunications School as well as to the fruit and vegetable section of the Malian Agricultural Products Office (OPAM), and a grant to the Malian Ministry of Agriculture. On 24 September, a financing agreement for 224 million Malian francs concerning the implementation of a village pilot reforestation project had been signed in Bamako between the Malian government and the Central Economic Cooperation Fund (CCCE). This amount is earmarked for the reforestation project mainly in the Koulikoro region where two nurseries will be set up and a mobile mechanized brigade established. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES in French 3 Oct 80 p 2415]

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END

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